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INTRODUCTION 
It was in 1664, the year he was ordained at the 
Congregation de l'Oratoire, that Nicolas Malebranche 
discovered Rene Descartes' posthumous Traite de l'Homme in 
a bookshop on the Rue Saint-Jacques. The effect of the 
encounter, according to Fontenelle, was dramatic. 
Il acheta le livre, le lut avec empresse-
ment, et, ce qu'on aura peut-gtre peine a 
croire~ avec un tel transport qu'il lui en 
prenait des battements de coeur qui 
l'obligeaient quelquefois d'interrompre sa 
lecture. { 1) 
But it was on the mind of Malebranche that the book 
had greater and more lasting effect. Indeed, Descartes was 
to become one of two major influences on the formation of 
Malebranche's thought. 
The other was Saint Augustine, the great thinker 
championed by the Oratory since it was established by Pierre 
de Berulle {later Cardinal) in 1611. 
It was this combination of Cartesian method and 
Platonic-Augustinian inspiration that was to become a marked 
characteristic of Malebranche's philosophy. Like the 
Oratorian Fathers who taught him, Malebranche saw no contra-
diction between questions of theology and the new science 
and mathematics. The two were compatible and the Cartesian 
method was the means of achieving this unity. 
This characteristic of Malebranche is seen clearly in 
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his celebrated doctrine of Occasionalism, which was first 
put forward in De la Recherche de la Verite (2) of 1674-5. 
To the philosopher it is essentially a doctrine of causal-
ity, maintaining that all created objects, including humans, 
are causally impotent, and merely provide the "occasions" 
for God, the only true cause, to act. 
Such a doctrine immediately raises important philos-
ophical questions, particularly as to the role played by 
humans within an Occasionalist Universe. It is the task of 
this thesis to consider one of these questions - Is Occas-
ionalism compatible with human free-will? 
If humans are causally impotent,. then they cannot be 
considered the cause of their actions or even choices. 
They are reduced to puppets, and puppets have no freedom if 
everything they do is caused by a higher authority. 
But the doctrine is not only of interest to the 
philosopher, for it raises questions important to the theol-
ogian as well. If we are not free to cause our actions, 
then we cannot be held morally responsible for them. And 
without this freedom there is no question of moral repre-
hensibility, for as Malebranche himself writes: 
Si nous n' avions point de liberte, il n'y 
auroit ni peines, ni r~compenses futuresi 
car sans liberte il n'y a ni bonnes ni 
mauvaises actions: De sorte que la Religion 
seroit une illusion & un phant~me. (3) 
Good and bad actions do occur, however. So does sin. 
But we cannot be held responsible for our sins if we are 
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not the causes of them, so where does responsibility lie? 
Occasionalism upholds God as the only true cause, but to 
suggest that God is responsible for sin is to enter onto 
very dangerous theological ground indeed. 
The doctrine of Occasionalism is characteristic of 
Malebranche. He was neither a philosopher nor a theologian 
alone, but a highly original thinker whose mind addressed 
itself to the problems of both, in an attempt to construct 
a world-view in which such problems are resolved. The 
doctrine of Occasionalism is a fundamental part of this 
construction. 
The first half of this thesis will consider Occasion-
alism - its history, its treatment by Malebranche and some 
of the problems it involves. 
The second half will then turn to the question of 
human freedom, in order to determine what place, if any, is 
left to it within an Occasionalist framework. It will begin 
with Malebranche's own conception of free-will, the problems 
that arise from it, and examine whether the freedom it 
grants us is sufficient for us to be held responsible for 
our actions. It will conclude with the question - Is any 
notion of human freedom possible within Occasionalism? 
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PART ONE - OCCASIONALISM 
CHAPTER ONE 
Occasionalism before Malebranche 
Mais les causes natureZZes ne sont point 
de veritables causes: ce ne sont que des 
causes oaaasionneZles, qui n' agissent que 
par la force & 1' efficace de la volonte 
de Dieu. (1) 
The doctrine of Occasionalism was not, as is often 
maintained, a "deus ex machina" device constructed by the 
Cartesians to solve the problem of mind/body interaction. 
The doctrine, with its correspondence of states between 
mind and body controlled directly by God, certainly pro-
vided an ingenious solution to this problem, but this was 
merely a consequence of the doctrine, and not its aim. 
Nor was Occasionalism an original doctrine in the 
Seventeenth Century. Daniel Whitby, a prominent English 
thinker, dismissed it in 1697 for being "but an invention 
of yesterday, spick and span new Philosophy, not discovered 
till this last Age", (2) therefore lacking the endorsement 
of time and undoubtedly suspect. 
In fact, Occasionalism predates the Cartesians by 
around seven centuries, taking form in the work of the 
Islamic theologians, or "Mutakillims" of the Ninth and 
Tenth Centuries, and their attempts to harmonise Aristotel-
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ian philosophy with traditional Koranic dogma. 
It was the Eleventh Century mystic al-Ghazali who 
became the champion of the new doctrine, taking it beyond 
a mere theological affirmation of Allah's omnipotence, and 
formulating a critical analysis of causation with striking 
similarities to th.e work of the later Cartesian Occasional-
ists Like Malebranche. 
Understandably, not everyone accepted the Occasional-
ist conclusions. The greatest opponent of al-Ghazali and 
his fellow Asharites was the last, and probably greatest of 
Aristotle's Muslim disciples, Ibn Rushd, or Averroes. In 
his most famous work Tahafut al-Tahafut (The Incoherence of 
the Incoherence), he attacks al-Ghaz~l!'s notions of causal-
ity and attempts to rehabilitate causal power to the natural 
plane. 
By the end of the Twelfth Century Occasionalism was 
already a well established and well argued doctrine in 
Islamic thought. By the Thirteenth Century this began to 
spread into Medieval Europe, particularly with the trans-
lation into Latin of fifteen of Averroes' thirty-eight 
commentaries. 
The real credit for transmitting the ideas of the 
Islamic Occasionalists to the Latin West, however, belongs 
to the famous Thirteenth Century Jewish philosopher and 
theologian Musa. ben Maimun, or Maimonides. His work 
Dalalat al-Ha'rin (Guide for the Perplexed), and its attempts 
to reconcile Mosaic teaching with Aristotelianism, had a 
profound influence on the emerging school of Latin Aristotel-
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ianism, of which Saint Thomas Aquinas was to be the champion. 
It was Aquinas who provided Occasionalism with its link to 
the Christian West. 
Cartesian Occasionalism 
With the exception of Nicolas d'Autrecourt, Occasional-
ism made very little progress in the Christian world during 
the Middle Ages. It was not until it was taken up by the 
Cartesians that it reached the level of influence it had 
enjoyed in Islamic teaching. 
Renl§ Descartes was not an "Occasionalist 11 , although 
he came very close of Occasionalism on a number of counts, 
particularly over questions of God's omnipotence. For 
example, in his letter to Princess Elisabeth of 6 October 
1645, he writes: 
Car on ne saurait demontrer qu'il existe, 
qu'en le consid(§rant comme un ~tre 
souverainement parfait; et il ne serait 
pas souverainement parfait, s'il pouvait 
arriver quelque chose dans le monde, qui 
ne v1nt pas entierement de lui ... mais 
Dieu est tellement la cause universelle 
de tout, qu'il en est en m~me fa~on la 
cause totale; et ainsi rien ne peut arriver 
sans sa volonte. (3) 
The efficacy of secondary causes is also called into 
serious question by the Cartesian notion of "continuous 
creation 11 , which Descartes outlines in ~ileditations, III. 
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En effet c'est une chose bien claire et 
bien evidente ... qu'une substance pour ~tre 
conservee dans tous les moments qu'elle 
dure, a besoin du m~me pouvoir, et de la 
meme action, qui serait necessaire pour la 
produire et la cr~er tout de nouveau, si 
le n'~tait point encore. En sorte que la 
lumiere naturel nous fait voir clairement, 
que la conservation et la creation ne differ-
ent qu'au regard de notre fa9on de penser, 
et non point en effet. (4) 
This was a notion that Malebranche himself embraced, 
so we will study its consequences in greater detail later. 
Briefly, involves the view that the continuing existence 
or conservation of an object is but its continuous re-
creation, and that the same power that created it "ex nihilo" 
required to maintain its conservation. Only God has the 
power to create from nothing, so only God has the power 
continuously to create, or conserve the object. And since 
to create an object at any given moment is to create it in 
such and such a state (at rest, in motion and so on), it is 
God who is the direct and constant cause not only the 
object itself, but of all its determinate states as well. 
Consequently, the role and causal efficacy of second-
ary causes is placed in serious doubt. My arm moves, not 
because I cause it to in any way, but because God re-creates 
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my arm in a different position at each successive moment. 
Several Cartesians before Malebranche followed 
Descartes' lines of reasoning to Occasionalist conclusions. 
Geraud de Cordemoy, in the Fourth Discourse of his Discerne-
ment du et de l'Ame (1666), considers the question of 
what it is to cause motion in a body. He begins with two 
definitions. 
{1) Causer le mouvement des corps, ne 
signifie autre chose, que mouvoir les corps. 
(2) Avoir du mouvement, ne signifie autre 
chose qu'~tre mG. (5) 
He then proposes five axioms. 
(1) On n'a pas de soy, ce qu'on peut 
perdre, sans cesser d'~tre ce qu'on est. 
(2) Tout corps pourroit perdre de son 
mouvement, jusqu'a n'en avoir plus, sans 
cesser d'~tre corps. 
(3) On ne peut concevoir que deux sortes 
de substances, s~avoir Z'Esprit (ou ce 
qui pense) & Ze Corps. C'est pourquoy on 
les doit considerer comme les causes de 
tout ce qui arrive; & ce qui ne peut venir 
de l'une, se doit necessairement attribuer 
~ l'autre. 
(4) Mouvoir, ou causer le mouvement, est 
une action. 
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(5) Une action ne peut ~tre continuee, 
que par l'agent, qui l'a commenc~e. (6} 
From the first two he concludes that motion is not an 
essence of a body - "Nul corps n 'a le mouvement de soy -m~me~'. 
(7) Thus the cause of motion in a body is something external 
to it. This, however, cannot be another body, for if it 
were, that body would have motion of itself. Therefore, the 
prime mover, by applying the third axiom, must be a mind. 
Finally, by applying the fourth and fifth axioms, he con-
cludes that "Ce ne peut ~tre que le m~me Esprit, qui a 
commenc~ a mouvoir les Corps, qui continug de les mouvoir". 
(8) This mind, however, cannot be one of our finite minds 
for several reasons. Firstly, actions occur, even in our 
own bodies, which we do not will. Secondly, many actions 
do not occur that we nevertheless do will. 
Mais un vieillard a beau vouloir marcher 
v~te, un yvrogne a beau vouloir marcher 
droit. (9) 
Moreover, argues Cordemoy, if a finite mind had the 
power to commence motion, then the quantity of motion in 
the Universe would depend on the whim and volitions of that 
mind and would constantly change, thereby upsetting the 
simplicity of God's creation. 
The prime mover, then, must be an infinite mind, and 
the only infinite mind is God's. Thus, when two balls 
collide, the first does not cause the second to move. 
Rather, "leur rencontre est une occasion l l'esprit, qui a 
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mn. les premiers, de mouvoir les seconds". (10) 
By considering the dualism of mind and body, Cordemoy 
extended this conclusion onto a psychological plane as well. 
Since mind and body are entirely disparate, having no common 
attributes, neither can be supposed to produce effects in 
the other. 
But if there is no interaction between mind and body, 
then why is it that a change in one almost always involves 
a change in the other? For example, when I will to raise my 
arm, my volition is followed by the desired movement. Is 
not my volition the cause of the movement? Cordemoy's reply 
is no. 
Tout ce qui est clair, c'est que l'esprit 
veut que le corps soit m~ en un sens, & 
A A que ce corps en meme temps est mu d'un 
mouvement conforme au desir de cet esprit. 
( 11) 
Our volitions do not cause the movements, but rather: 
n~tre volonte soit une occasion ~ la 
puissance qui meut deja un corps, d'en 
diriger le mouvement vers un certain c~te 
repondant ~ cette pens,e. (12) 
Our volitions are "occasional causes", providing the occas-
ion for God, the only true cause, to create certain motions. 
In the same year that Cordemoy's book was published, 
another Cartesian, Louis de la Forge, followed a similar 
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reasoning in his work Trait~ de l'Esprit de l'Homme. By 
considering the complete dissimilarity of mind and body 
maintained by Cartesian dualism, La Forge is led' to ponder 
how the two can be united. 
Two bodies are united when their solid parts are so 
firmly pressed together as to produce one continuous thing. 
Or tout de mesme que deux Corps sont vnis, 
lors qu'ils sont aussi proches qu'ils 
peuuent estre pour agir & p~tir dependemment 
l'vn de l'autre. (13) 
Likewise, two minds can be said to be united by love when 
their thoughts and desires are directed toward each other. 
Et comme deux Esprits sont en parfaite 
vnion lors qu'ils s'aiment tellement, 
qu'ils viennent ~ ne vouloir plus rien, 
' I • 1 "" 1' & a n auo1r p us aucune pensee que vn 
pour l'amour de l'autre. (14} 
But neither of these unions pertains to the relation-
ship of mind and body: not by a fusion of solid parts, since 
mind has no solid parts, nor by love, since the body is a 
machine, devoid of emotion and thought. 
Nevertheless, when I desire to raise my arm the arm 
moves, so clearly some relationship exists between my mind 
and my body. What form does this relationship take? 
La Forge's conclusion is that between mind and body 
there is merely a correlation of states, and not a causal 
relationship, i.e. a change in the modifications of one 
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coincides with a change in the modifications of the other, 
without actually "causing" them. The true cause is God, 
for only a wise and powerful being could correlate perfectly 
the two states. 
Mind and body, then, do not cause changes in each 
other, for only God can do this. Rather, an event in one 
acts as a "cause particuliere" that leads God, the "cause 
universelle" to produce the appropriate effect. 
This is also true of the relationship between bodies. 
God is the prime mover, the first cause of motion. Never-
theless, bodies are particular causes of different movements 
"en determinant & obligeant la cause premiere ~ apliquer sa 
force & sa vertu motrice sur des Corps sur qui il ne 
l'auroit pas exercee sans eux". (15) 
Another Cartesian and contemporary of both Cordemoy 
and La Forge was the Belgian philosopher Arnold Geulincx. 
He arrived at an Occasionalist conclusion by reasoning from 
the premise that a true causal agent must know not only that 
it acts, but also how it acts. Thus, a material object can-
not be the true cause of any effect in either a material or 
spiritual being, since it lacks consciousness and therefore 
cannot know that it acts or how it acts. Likewise, a spirit-
ual thing, such as my mind, cannot be a true cause since 
although I know that effects are produced, I do not know how 
they are produced. Therefore, to be the true cause of motion 
in my arm, it is necessary for me to know the entire physio-
logical process involved. Naturally, only an omniscient 
being has such knowledge, namely God. 
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This argument, based on the highly questionable prem-
ise "Ego non facio id quod quomodo fiat nescio, (I do not 
make (i.e. cause) what I do not know how to make (cause)"), 
(16) is one that Malebranche himself was to employ, so it 
will be considered in more detail later. 
Geulincx's conclusion is that God, the only omnipotent 
and omniscient being, is the only real cause. The body and 
the soul are like two clocks, "neither of which acts on the 
other but which keep perfect time because God constantly 
synchronizes their movements". (17) In this way, a desire 
in my mind is followed by a bodily movement because God 
.correlates the two states thus, not because of any causal 
relationship. 
By the time Malebranche began formulating his own 
philosophy, Occasionalism was certainly not a new doctrine. 
In fact, Malebranche was to support a world-view already 
widely held by many of his contemporaries, and one that 
could trace its roots back seven centuries to the Muslim 
world of Baghdad. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
MALEBRANCHE'S OCCASIONALISM 
Introduction 
Malebranche's own Occasionalism, which was first put 
forward in the Recherche, and reiterated in the subsequent 
works, borrowed many elements from his Cartesian peers such 
as Cordemoy and La Forge. The two greatest influences on 
the formation of his philosophy, however, were Saint August-
ine and Rene Descartes. From the former came the inspir-
ation, the same vindication of the absolute omnipotence of 
God and the dependence of creatures that had motivated the 
Islamic Mutakallims seven centuries before. 
From Descartes came the method to be employed - the 
tools of reasoning by "clear and distinct ideas", and the 
ontological framework of substance and modification within 
which this reasoning was to take place. In the two great 
thinkers Malebranche found both the means and the end of 
his enquiry. As Victor De1bos writes in his Etude de la 
Philosophie de Malebranche: 
La force du sentiment religieux qui pousse 
ainsi Malebranche a concentrer en Dieu 
toute causa1ite et toute puissance est 
soutenue encore par le besoin de satisfaire 
a la r~g1e cartesienne de la clarte et de 
la distinction des idees. (1) 
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Malebranche's Occasionalism 
The first step in Malebranche's Occasionalism is an 
attack on the efficacy of secondary causes, which he consid-
ered to be the logical consequence of adhering strictly to 
the Cartesian rule of reasoning only by clear and distinct 
ideas, within a framework of substance and modification, an 
ontology that Malebranche himself accepts without question. 
To understand the reasoning, it is, therefore, neces-
sary to understand the Cartesian ontology, which maintains 
that everything in the created realm is either a being or a 
mode of being, i.e. either a substance or a modification, 
·which is merely "l'gtre mgme d 'une telle fa~on". (2) 
From this, seven principles arise, which Daisie Radner 
identifies in her work Malebranche. 
(1) A modification cannot subsist without 
some substance. 
(2) A modification can only be a modifi-
cation of one substance. 
(3) One cannot conceive a modification 
without conceiving the substance of which 
it is the modification. 
(4) A modification cannot be where its 
substance is not. 
(5) A modification cannot pass from one 
substance to another. 
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(6) Only that which gives being can give 
modes of being. 
(7) A modification cannot have more extent 
than its substance. (3) 
With this in mind, Malebranche follows Cordemoy in 
considering the question of what it is to cause motion. 
Matter 
If we consider the simple example of a ball (Ball A) 
travelling across a plane and coming into collision with a 
second ball at rest (Ball B) , what can we say occurs in this 
collision? 
Experience suggests to us that, when Ball A collides 
with Ball B, it "causes" the motion in the latter, or 
communicates its own motion to Ball B, causing it to move. 
Experience, however, warns Malebranche, is deceptive. 
Renonce, Mon fils, ~ tes prejugez, & ne 
juge jamais ~ l'egard des effets naturels, 
qu'une chose soit l'effet d'une autre, 
a cause que l'exp~rience t'apprend qu'elle 
ne manque jamais de la suivre. (4) 
When we reconsider what we see, we have to admit that 
all we witness in the collision is that Ball A stops moving 
and Ball B starts to move, or as Charles McCracken writes: 
we would judge that the impact of one 
body on another is temporally antecedent to 
the inception or change of motion in the 
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second body; but even our eyes would not 
tell us that the first event caused the 
second. ( 5) 
Experience does not tell us what causes the motion in 
Ball B, only that it occurs; and since it is mute on the 
subject we must consult our reason, which tells us many 
things. 
Firstly, a body cannot move itself, for it has only a 
passive capability of receiving figure and motion. Ball B 
does not move itself. 
Secondly, the same force is required to keep a body 
in motion as to move it in the first place, and since a 
body cannot move itself, it follows that it cannot have a 
force to keep itself moving. 
It is illogical, therefore, to suggest that Ball A 
somehow communicates a moving force to Ball B, when it has 
no such force to communicate. Moreover, even if it did 
have this force, it would be a modification of Ball A, and 
modifications can only be the modifications of one substance. 
They cannot, therefore, be communicated. 
From this, five conclusions can be drawn. 
(1) A body cannot move itself. 
Therefore 
(2) A body cannot keep itself in motion. 
(3) A body cannot move another body. 
(4) Motion in a body is caused by something 
other than a body. 
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And since there are only bodies and minds in the Cartesian 
framework, then: 
(5) The cause of motion in bodies must be 
a mind. 
This reasoning is very similar to that followed by 
Cordemoy in the Discernement, and it continues to reach the 
same Occasionalist conclusion. 
Since modifications cannot be communicated, the only 
way of causing a modification in a body is by creating it. 
Moreover, only that which creates being can create modes of 
being, and since only God can create being, only He can 
create its modes. 
It is God alone, then, who can cause motion in a body. 
In the collision it is God who is the cause of the motion 
in Ball B, just as he is the cause of motion in Ball A. 
The collision is merely the "occasion" for God to produce a 
particular effect. 
The interaction of matter is where Occasionalism 
functions at its most simple. When we consider the relation-
ships of bodies and minds, and minds with other minds, things 
get decidedly more complex. 
Mind and Matter 
In the formulation of his philosophy, Malebranche 
borrowed many elements from Ren~ Descartes. One of these is 
the notion that there are only two kinds of substance, mental 
and material, or "mind" and "matter". 
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Like Cordemoy and La Forge 1 Malebranche addresses 
himself to the problems that such a dualism involves for 
questions of causality. How do two things as entirely 
disparate as mind and matter act on each other? 
Descartes' own solution was to posit an interaction 
made possible by the "union" of mind and body in the pineal 
gland. This union 1 he admits in a letter to Princess 
Elisabeth, he is not able to explain, but it is something 
"que chacun ~preuve toujours en soi-meme sans philosopher", 
(June 2 8 , 16 4 3) ( 6) . 
This did not satisfy Malebranche. In Entretiens sur 
.la M~taphysigue he attacks Descartes' lack of exactness. 
Ce mot union, est un des plus equivoques 
qu ' il y ai t. ( 7) 
It does not lead us any closer to an understanding of 
their interaction. Minds cannot have motions and bodies 
cannot have thoughts, so even if they are in a sense 
11 United 11 , they cannot share the same sorts of modifications. 
Consequently, they fail to meet Descartes' own necessary 
condition for causal interaction, "resemblence", i.e. that 
anything which acts as a cause must contain in itself what 
it imparts. 
quia si concedatur aliquid esse in effectu, 
A quod non fuerit in causa, concedendum etiam 
est hoc aliquid a nihilo factum esse. (8) 
(For if we allow that there is something in 
the effect that was not in the cause, we 
must admit also that this something has been 
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created from nothing.) 
Malebranche's solution to mind/body interaction was 
to reverse Descartes' approach to the problem. Instead of 
trying to find a theory of causation that fitted into the 
Cartesian ontology, he formulated a construction that this 
ontology itself fitted into. This construction was 
Occasional ism. 
Malebranche's approach to mind and body follows that 
for matter. The problem is the same - how can any substance 
interact with another? 
If I consider the example of my desiring to raise my 
arm, and my arm subsequently moving, then what can I say 
about the relationship between desire and motion? Experi-
ence shows that my desire is immediately followed by the 
desired action, and suggests that my volition is the cause 
of the motion. But on reflection, all it really shows is 
"that the movements of our body follow our efforts, but it 
does not teach us that they are caused by our efforts 11 • (9) 
As with the collision of two balls, mere concomitance does 
not prove causality. Experience, therefore, is once again 
mute, and we must consult reason. 
Let us begin by assuming that the mind really is the 
cause of the motion. What this means is that it possesses 
a moving force that is able to set a body in motion. Now, 
this cannot involve the communication of motion, since 
motion is something that does not pertain to minds. And 
even if it did, it would be a modification and therefore 
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uncommunicable. 
What this involves is that the mind wills and the 
body moves, the mind continues willing and the body contin-
ues moving. Now, to be the true cause of this motion, 
argues Malebranche, there must be a "necessary connection" 
between the volition and the movement. Yet it is quite 
possible that I will to raise my arm and the movement does 
not occur. 
Mais quand on examine l'idee que l'on a 
de tous les esprits finis, on ne voit 
point de liaison necessaire entre leur 
volonte & le mouvement de quelque corps 
que ce soit, on voit au contraire qu'il 
n'y en a point, & qu'il n'y en peut avoir. 
(10) 
Or il me paro~t tres-certain que la 
volonte des esprits n'est pas capable 
de mouvoir le plus petit corps qu'il y 
ait au monde: car il est evident qu'il 
n'y a point de liaison necessaire, entre 
,; la volonte que nous avons, par exemple, 
de remlier notre bras, & le mouvement de 
notre bras. ( 11) 
Malebranche's second objection borrows a leaf from 
Arnold Geulincx, and involves his highly questionable notion 
that we do not cause what we do not know how to cause. 
Ego non facio id quod quomodo fiat·nescio. 
(12) 
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This argument contends that a true cause must not only bring 
about the complete physiological process, but must know 
every detail of this process as well. Naturally, only an 
omniscient being possesses such knowledge. 
A Peut-on faire, peut-on meme vouloir ce 
qu'on ne s¥ait point faire? Peut-on 
vouloir que les esprits animaux se repandent 
dans certains muscles, sans s¥avoir si on 
a des esprits & des muscles? On peut 
vouloir remuer les doigts, parce qu'on 
voit & qu'on s¥ait qu'on en a: mais peut-on 
vouloir pousser des esprits qu'on ne voit 
point, & qu'on ne connoit point? Peut-on 
les transporter dans des muscles egalement 
inconnus, par les tuyaux des nerfs egalement 
invisibles, & choisir promtement & immancable-
ment celui qui repond au doigt, qu'on veut 
remlier. (13) 
The mind cannot will something of which it is ignorant, 
and since my mind is ignorant of the physiological requirements 
in the raising of an arm, it cannot will that movement. It 
cannot, therefore, be considered the true c~se of the movement. 
Malebranche's final objection is that, if my finite 
mind were the true cause of the motion in my arm, then the 
only way it could do this is by creating it, because it 
cannot communicate the motion in any way. But only the 
creator of being can create modes of being, so either my 
mind can create being ex nihilo, or I am not the true cause 
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of the movement. My will is omnipotent, or I am causally 
impotent. And while the latter is difficult to accept, 
the former is simply impossible. 
Malebranche's objections to the causal efficacy of 
finite minds leads naturally to an Occasionalist conclusion. 
It is only between the will of an infinite being and its 
fects that we can see a necessary connection, for it is 
inconceivable that God, an omnipotent being, wills a motion 
and that motion does not occur. 
Thus, when I will to move my arm, God also wills to 
move it, and since God's will is necessarily efficacious, 
the arm necessarily moves. My volition is the occasional 
cause, determining God, the true cause, to produce such and 
such an effect. 
Done la force qui produit le mouvement de 
ton bras vient de Dieu, en cons~quence 
n~anmoins de ta volonte par elle m~me 
inefficace. (14) 
This process, like the distribution of motion, is 
subject to a few simple laws, the laws of mind and body, 
which state that a change in the modifications of one 
corresponds to a change in the modifications of the other. 
Thus, there is a correspondence of their states, but no 
question of causation between mind and body. And this 
relationship, like any correspondence, functions in two 
directions, i.e. from mind to body and also from body to 
mind. 
Consider, for example, what happens when I jab my 
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finger with a pin. Experience suggests that the pain is 
"caused" by the jab, or the pin's action on the nerve 
~fibres. Reason, however, tells us that bodies are entirely 
passive, and possess only a capability of receiving figure 
and motion. 
consultez l'idee de l'etendue: & jugez 
par cette idee qui represente les corps, 
ou rienne les represente, s'ils peuvent 
avoir d'autre propriete que la faculte 
passive de recevoir diverses figures & 
divers mouvemens. (15) 
They have no active or moving power. Moreover, they 
cannot share their modifications with the mind, since the 
modifications of material substance do not pertain to 
mental substance. Nor could these modifications be communi-
cated, as we have already established. The disturbance in 
the body on the occasion of the jab cannot be considered 
the cause of the mental disturbance we experience. 
Malebranche presents a. further objection by appealing 
to the Augustinian principle that the inferior cannot have 
dominion over the superior. The mind is clearly superior to 
·the body, but if our body is capable of producing different 
sentiments of happiness, pain, pleasure, sadness and so on, 
then it enjoys a domination over our mind. 
Car si le feu ou le soleil peut vous 
recompenser & vous punir, vous rendre 
heureux ou malheureux par le plaisir ou 
la douleur, il faut qu'il soit au-dessus 
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de vous; il faut qu'il ait puissance sur 
vous: & vous devez lui ~tre so~is, parce 
que c'est une loi inviolable que les 
chases inf~rieures soient so~mises aux 
sup~rieures. (16) 
It is not the pin-prick which, according to Malebranche, 
causes the sensation of pain. It acts merely as the occasion 
for God to produce a disturbance in our mind, according to 
the general laws of mind and body. 
The relationship between mind and body is, therefore, 
one of 'psycho-physical parallelism'. Just as two parallel 
lines never touch, but follow each other's path, so mind and 
body never directly interact. A correspondence exists be-
tween their states, but this is due to the intervention and 
control of a higher authority, God. 
In this way,.Malebranche's Occasionalism is very simi-
lar to Geulincx's "two clocks" and Leibniz's "pre-established 
harmony," a theory that maintains no causal link between 
monads, but a correspondence between their states according 
to a pre-established harmony created by God when He created 
the Universe. 
The union of soul and body, and even the 
operation of one substance on another, 
consists only in this perfect mutual 
agreement, purposely established by the 
order of the first creation, in virtue 
of which each substance, following its 
own laws, agrees with what the others 
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demand; and the operations of the one 
thus follow or accompany the operation 
or change of the other. (17) 
There is, however, an important difference between the 
two Occasionalist theories of Malebranche and Geulincx, and 
Leibniz's pre-established harmony. In Occasionalism, the 
Universe was not constructed and set to function on its own, 
for God, as the only true cause, is required at all times to 
produce effects, or in the case of Geulincx, constantly to 
. ~ synchron~ze the two clocks. The Occasionalist Universe might 
be a finely constructed machine, but it requires the constant 
attention of its creator to keep it running. 
Mind and Mind 
We have considered the interaction of matter, and the 
problematic area of mind/body interaction, but there still 
remains one relationship which must be dealt with - mind 
acting on mind. Can my mind effect change in itself, or in 
the mind of another person? 
Malebranche begins by considering our own minds, and 
argues that there are at least some sentiments we have that 
we do not wish to have. 
Ce n•est point non plus mon arne qui 
produit en elle ce sentiment de douleur 
qui l'afflige; car el 
elle. (18) 
4' 
en souffre malgre 
But this, on its own, does not deny the mind causal 
power, it only establishes that our minds are not the causes 
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of at least some of our sentiments. What about the senti-
ments the mind has and wishes to have? 
To this Malebranche replies that if we were the true 
cause of such sentiments, then we would always desire to 
feel pleasure and to produce it in ourselves. 
Si j'etois la cause du plaisir que je 
sens, comme je l'aime ce plaisir, j'en 
produirois to~jours en moi. (19) 
But we do not always experience pleasure when we wish 
to, so there are some cases where the wish for a sentiment 
occurs without the sentiment resulting. Thus, there is no 
necessary connection between the willing and the experience 
of a sentiment, and where there is no necessary connection, 
there is no causation. 
Malebranche also puts forward Geulincx's argument, 
i.e. a mind cannot do what it does not know how to do. My 
mind has no clear idea of itself or its sentiments. Nor 
does it know how to modify itself or produce particular 
sentiments. It cannot, therefore, be considered the cause 
of its sentiments. 
And if we are unable to produce sentiments in our own 
minds, then it is inconceivable that we produce them in the 
minds of other people. 
Conclusion 
In Malebranche's Occasionalist Universe, nothing hap-
pens unless God wills it. Matter has no causal power over 
either matter or mind, and mind has no causal power over 
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mind or matter. The only one with such power is God, the 
one true cause. The created realm is nothing more than a 
collection of inefficacious beings, depending on God's 
constant intervention for all aspects of their existence. 
But this seems to reduce God's creation to a system totally 
without purpose, and if creatures have no purpose, then that 
creation does not attest God's wisdom, but detracts from it. 
If God's power is required to do everything from creating 
planets to sneezing, then what role does the impotent 
creature play in such a Universe? 
Malebranche 1 s response is that the created realm is 
essential to the running of this Universe, for without 
creatures, creation would be, in Craig Walton's words, 
"only a beautifully structured blueprint". (20) 
The key to this is that whenever God acts, He must do 
so in accordance with His nature, i.e. "d'une manH~re qui 
porte le caract~re de ses attributs". (21) God is by nature 
both immutable and wise. His immutability obliges Him to 
act in a constant and uniform mannerc and His infinite 
wisdom demands that the manifold variety of effects in His 
creation be produced by a few simple laws. It is more the 
mark of wisdom to produce the same effects by simple means 
than by complex means. 
With respect to motion, for example, the laws are both 
few and simple. 
s¥avoir, que tout mouvement se fasse ou 
tende a se faire en ligne droite, & que 
dans le choc les mouvemens se communiquent 
a proportion, & selon la ligne de leur 
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pression. ( 22) 
Thus, when Ball A hits Ball B, the distribution of 
motion is regulated by those general laws, which are simply 
God acting in a certain way by general volitions. The 
simplicity and constancy of the laws are, therefore, assured. 
Consequently, we are able to avoid the path that led 
David Hume to scepticism. 
Objects have no discoverable connexion 
togetheri nor is it from any other principle 
but custom operating upon the imagination, 
that we can draw any inference from the 
~pp~arance of one to the existence of 
another. (23) 
We may induce that the sun will rise tomorrow by sim-
ple enumeration, but that assumption is reinforced because 
we know that the sun's motion is regulated by God's laws, 
which are simple, and above all constant. 
Of course, God is quite able to surprise us by not 
raising the sun tomorrow, but this would be for Him to act 
outside His own laws. Such action requires a particular 
volition, or miracle, and these are employed by God only: 
lorsque l'excellence ou la perfection 
qu'une telle volonte produira dans son 
ouvrage exprimera davantage ses attributs 
que s'il avoit agi a son ordinaire. (24) 
All motion, then, is regulated by a few simple laws. 
This attests .His immutability. But if these laws never 
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change, then how does one explain the enormous variety of 
effects witnessed in nature? When a moving automobile 
strikes a train at rest, the distribution of motion is 
certainly not the same as when a moving train hits a station-
ary car. 
The answer to this is the wide diversity in the modi-
fications of the bodies in question. In two separate 
collisions producing two different effects, the laws of 
motion are the same, and they are constant. It is the 
modifications of the objects involved, such as figure, mass 
and so on, that determine· God to produce different results. 
In this way, God is able to produce a variety of effects 
without any change in His conduct. This attests His 
wisdom. 
The importance of secondary causes is, therefore, 
twofold.. Firstly, without them, God's general laws would 
not produce effects, for there would be nothing to produce 
the effects in. As Craig Walton writes, "Laws are not 
established if they govern nothing". (25) 
For example, the general volition that forms the law 
of the collision of bodies will have no efficacy unless 
there are bodies to collide. As Malebranche writes in 
Traite de la Nature et de la Grace: 
Car afin que la cause generale agisse p9r 
des loix ou par des volontez generales, & 
que son action soit reglee, constante & 
uniforme, il est absolument necessaire 
qu'il y ait quelque cause occasionnelle 
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qui d~te~mine l'efficace de ces loix~ 
& qui se~ve a les ~tablir. (26) 
Occasional causes, however, allow Him to produce the 
wide variety of observable effects with a small number of 
these laws. 
Il falloit effectivement une cause 
occasionnelle a une cause generale, comme 
je vous le prouverai bien-tot, afin que 
cette cause generale agissant to~jours 
d'une maniere uniforme & constante, elle 
put produire dans son ouvrage par des 
mo1ens tres-simples, & des loix generales 
to~jours les m~mes, une infinite d'effets 
differens. (27) 
Secondly, not only do occasional causes allow God to 
produce certain effects, they actually "determine" Him to 
do so. For example, a collision between two balls is the 
occasion for God to produce an effect, but the nature of 
that effect is determined by the balls themselves, and 
their modifications. That is why the effects are so differ-
ent in a collision between a train and a car, depending on 
which one is in motion. 
Likewise, when I will to move my arm, it is my desire 
to do so that, as occasional cause, determines God to pro-
duce the desired movement. As Daisie Radner writes: 
That God's general volitions give rise to 
effects at all depends upon the existence 
of occasional causes, and what particular 
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effects God's general volitions give rise 
to in a given situation depends upon the 
character of the occasional cause which 
is present. (28) 
R. ~v. Church, in his A Study in the Philosophy of 
Malebranche, regarded this determining role as detracting 
from God's power, for how can God be all powerful if a 
creature can dictate to Him how to act? 
That God should be determined by His 
creatures contradicts His omnipotence. {29) 
This criticism,.· however, ignores one important point 
- God chooses to be determined by His creatures in order 
to run the Universe by general laws. He is not obliged to 
produce a particular effect on any given occasion, for He 
has the power to act in complete disregard of His occasion-
al causes if he so wishes. That he chooses not to does not 
detract from that power or His omnipotence. 
The effect that God produces in any occasion, then, 
is determined by the occasion itself. When two balls 
collide, the circumstances of the collision determine the 
effect. V1hen I will to do something, my volition may be 
inefficacious, but it nevertheless determines God to act in 
a certain manner. In this way, we enjoy a sort of vicarious 
power. We may be causally impotent, but we do have some 
say in the running of God's creation. 
But here a problem becomes apparent, the first of 
several which we will now discuss. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
PROBLEMS OF OCCASIONALISM 
The Problem of Precedence and other 
If occasional causes determine God to produce a particu-
lar effect, then it is essential that God listens to their 
instruction, or as Antoine Arnauld expresses it: 
que Dieu attende ces causes occasionnelles~ 
& ne les pPevienne point; c'est-a-dire, que 
ce ne soit pas Dieu qui determine ces 
causes a mettre la condition ensuite de 
laquelle l'effet se produit; mais que ce 
soit ces causes qui determinent la volonte 
de Dieu A un tel ou tel effet de plusieurs 
auxquels on doit supposer qu'elle est 
indeterminee, sans quoi on ne doit pas 
dire qu'il a agi par des volontes generales. 
( 1) 
In other words, when I desire to move my arm, the 
desire must be wholly my own, i.e. I must choose of my own 
accord to will to move it. If God creates the desire within 
me, then, in effect, He is determining Himself to produce 
the action. He would be determining the efficacy of His own 
general volition and thereby remove any distinction between 
general and particular volitions. 
The desire must be my own. This, however, leads to a 
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problem, for it posits a creative power denied by Occasion-
alism. If God does not create the desire, then it must be 
me who does so. 
The collision of bodies is no less problematical. 
Occasionalism demands that bodies can do nothing of their 
own accord. They cannot, therefore, collide of their own 
accord. Only God can make them collide, for only He can 
impart motion to them. But if God creates the collision, 
then it is He who introduces the conditions of the collision, 
and once again determines the efficacy of His own general 
laws, and not the occasional cause at all. 
It would appear, then, that the two principal tenets 
of Occasionalism are at odds. If occasional causes are to 
determine the efficacy of God's general volitions, and have 
some role to play in God's creation, then it is false that 
God does everything as real cause. As R.W. Church concludes 
in A Study in the Philosophy of Malebranche: 
Hence Malebranche must either render super-
fluous the intervention of God by granting 
to occasional causes the efficacy proper to 
causes, or he must maintain that God is the 
sole cause in every sense, and thus deny to 
occasional causes all meaning. (2) 
The second problem that arises concerns a matter that 
we have already discussed - the way God's conduct displays 
the character of His attributes, and particularly whether 
an Occasionalist Universe attests these attributes. 
There is nothing in God's nature that obliged Him to 
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create the Universe. That He did so was entirely contingent. 
Once He had decided to do so, however, He was constrained by 
His nature to create it in a certain way, i.e. attesting 
His wisdom, benevolence and immutability. For some thinkers, 
the Universe was a success in this respect. Leibniz consid-
ered it the best of all possible worlds, its perfection be-
ing "a function of the diversity of its phenomena and the 
simplicity of its laws". ( 3) 
Bernard Fontenelle, Antoine Arnauld and John Locke, 
however, came to a quite different conclusion, contending 
that an Occasionalist system is neither wise nor simple. 
For example, to follow a plan in a wise manner is to 
follow it fully. Malebranche, however, has God act by 
general volitions which, as Malebranche admits, allow de-
fects to enter into His creation. 
Mais comment auroit-on pO justifier sa 
sagesse & sa bonte~ voyant tant de monstres 
parmi Zes corps~ tant de deregZemens parmi 
Zes esprits~ tant de disproportion dans 
son action par rapport aux desseins digne 
de ses attributs~ tant de pZuyes sur Zes 
sabZons & dans Za mer~ tant de graces sur 
des coeurs endurcis . .• ? {4) 
God does not will such defects, but He does neverthe-
less allow them, because to remedy them would be to detract 
from the simplicity of His plan. 
mais Dieu ne multiplie pas ses volontez 
pour remedier aux desordres vrais ou 
apparens qui sont des suites necessaires 
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des loix naturelles. Dieu ne doit pas 
corriger ni changer ces loix, quoi qu'elles 
produisent quelquefois des monstres. Il 
ne doit pas troubler l'uniformite de sa 
conduite & la simplicite de ses voyes. {5) 
But in allowing such defects, God admits into His 
creation things that were not originally in H plan. He 
does not, therefore, execute that plan fully, for as Fonten-
elle argues in Doutes sur le syst~me Physique des Causes 
Occasionnelles of 1686: 
"' . Or, une executlon pleine, non-seulement 
comprend tout ce qui est dans le dessein, 
mais exclut tout ce qui n'en est point. {6) 
Fontenelle's charge against Malebranche is that by 
having God act by general volitions, He sacrifices the 
wisdom of His design to the simplicity of its execution, 
when it should be the reverse. 
Il est tres-sage, il doit executer son 
dessein pleinement: il est tres-simple, 
il doit l'executer simplement: mais il 
ne peut l'executer pleinement et simplement 
en meme temps; sa sagesse et sa simplicite 
se combattent; il faut qu'il rel~che de 
!'execution pleine de son dessein, pour 
donner ce qui est at a la simplicite. (7) 
In his Reflexions sur le Nouveau Systeme de la Nature 
et de la Gr~ce of 1685, Antoine Arnauld concurs. 
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Car a qui est-ce que le bon sens ne fait 
pas comprendre, que les voies etant pour 
l'ouvrage, & non l'ouvrage pour les voies, 
est sans doute plus digne d'un agent 
sage, de pro~uire un ouvrage beaucoup 
plus parfait par des voies moins simples, 
qu'un beaucoup mains parfait par des voies 
plus simples? (8) 
John Locke approaches from the opposite tack. In 
Remarks upon some of Mr Norris's Books of 1693, he attacks 
the Occasionalist Universe for its very lack of simplicity. 
· If God is obliged by His nature to act in the simplest of 
ways, then He must never do anything in vain. But if God 
is the only true cause, then for what purpose has He created 
such elaborate instruments like the eye and the ear? 
For if the perception of colours and sounds 
depended on nothing but the presence of the 
object affording an occasional cause to God 
Almighty to exhibit to the mind the ideas 
of figures, colours, and sounds, all that 
nice and curious structure of those organs 
is wholly in vain. (9) 
In other words, if it is God that produces the image 
of the object to my mind, then why has it been necessary for 
Him to equip me with a complicated organ simply to duplicate 
that operation? Does this not detract from the simplicity 
of creation and contradict the spirit of Occam's Razor? 
Unfortunately, Locke's attack ignores the relationship 
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between the occasional cause and the efficient cause, God. 
It might be God that produces the image in the brain, but 
He is determined in doing this by the nature of the light 
entering the eye and the consequent state of the optic 
nerve. Such organs, therefore, are not unnecessary contri-
vances, for without them there would be nothing to determine 
God how to act. 
Locke continues later in the Remarks to argue that by 
reserving all causal power to God alone, at the expense of 
the created realm, the Occasionalists in fact diminish God's 
power. 
The infinite eternal God is certainly the 
cause of all things, the fountain of all 
being and power. But because all being 
was from him, can there be nothing but 
God himself? or because all power was 
originally in him, can there be nothing 
of it communicated to his creatures? 
This is to set very narrow bounds to the 
power of God, and, by pretending to extend 
it, takes it away. (10) 
The analogy he uses recalls Geulincx's theory of the 
two clocks. 
For which (I beseech you, as we can compre-
hend) is the perfectest power, to make a 
machine - a watch, for example - that, 
when the watchmaker has withdrawn his hands, 
shall go and strike by the fit contrivance 
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of the parts; or else requires that when-
ever the hand, by pointing to the hour, 
minds him of it, he should strike twelve 
upon the bell? (11) 
According to Locke, the Occasionalist Universe is far 
from a wise and simple construction, for it requires God's 
constant interference and tinkering if it is to function. 
The third problem of Occasionalism is closely linked 
to what we have already discussed on the matter of our 
desires acting as occasional causes. When I will to move 
my arm, my own volition is inefficacious. God, however, 
heeds my desire and provides the efficient power to move 
the arm. 
The question has already arisen as to what the cause 
of my desire itself might be. There are two possibilities 
- myself or God. If it is the former, then it suggests a 
causal power denied by Occasionalism. If it is the latter, 
it leads to a Universe in which God seems to determine the 
efficacy of His own general volitions, rendering all occas-
ional causes superfluous. 
But there is a further problem that arises. If God 
is the true cause of the desire, then what is its occasional 
cause? This must surely be some previous desire, i.e. a 
desire to have a desire to do something. And of course the 
same question then applies itself to that antecedent desire, 
and so on in an infinite regress. The only way to avoid 
this is to give humans at least causal power over the orig-
inal desire for an action. But this is, of course, contrary 
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to Occasionalism. 
The final problem to be considered involves 
Malebranche's claim that between a true cause and its 
effects there must exist a "necessary connection". Such a 
connection exists only between an omnipotent being and its 
effects, and hence only God can be considered a true cause. 
But on reflection, it becomes evident that this argu-
ment is not based on any clear notion we have concerning 
causality and God's will, but rather on our definition of 
God. We cannot see a necessary connection between God's 
will and its effects, for we have no idea of God's will. 
We only assume such a connection must exist because if it 
did not, God would not be omnipotent. 
Car, m~me si tu crois que Dieu fait ce 
qu'il veut, ce n'est point que tu voies 
clairement, qu'il y a une liaison necessaire 
entre la volonte de Dieu & les effets, 
puisque tu ne s9ais pas m~me ce que c'est 
que la volonte de Dieu. Mais c'est qu'il 
est evident, que Dieu ne seroit pas tout 
puissant, si ses volontez absolues 
demeuroient inefficaces. (12) 
In other words, God's efficacy stems from His defin-
ition, and not from any power we know He possesses. As 
R.W. Church writes: 
The conclusion that God alone is the cause 
thus rests, not on any known necessary 
connection between His will and any effect 
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we like to imagine, but rather on the idea 
of the omnipotence of God. (13) 
And the effect of this is, as Beatrice Rome concludes in 
The Philosophy of Malebranche, "to reduce the whole argument 
to empty verbalism". (14) 
If we reconsider precisely what we know about causal-
ity, then we are forced to admit that we have no clear idea 
of either "power" or 11 efficacy 11 • Efficacy in God, therefore, 
is really no more intelligible than efficacy in creatures, 
since both are mysteries to us. Malebranche is not justi-
fied in denying such efficacy to creatures alone. He must 
restore it to them, or deny it in God as well. 
Conclusion 
By reserving true causal power to God alone, Male-
branche leads himself into serious difficulty on several 
questions concerning the role of the occasional cause. We 
have dealt with some of these, but we now arrive at the 
most complex, and one that is of crucial importance to both 
the philosopher and the theologian - the question of human 
freedom and moral responsibility. 
It is to this area that our discussion will now turn, 
in order to .determine what freedom, if any, Occasionalism 
grants to human-beings, and whether this freedom is suffic-
ient for us to be held morally responsible for our actions. 
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PART TWO 
CHAPTER FOUR 
MALEBRANCHE'S MORALE 
Introduc 
For a man to be held responsible for his actions, it 
is necessary that those actions are truly his, i.e. that 
they are the result of a free and unconstrained choice on 
his part. This choice presupposes that at the time of any 
. action, the man is free to do something other than that 
action. If he is forced to act, then that freedom is absent, 
and so too is any notion of responsibility for the action. 
This is fundamental to any moral system. 
The question that this discussion will now address is 
whether, given Occasionalism, man enjoys this basic freedom. 
To maintain free-will alongside a doctrine that upholds God 
as the only true cause, resulting in a causally impotent 
created realm, involves serious problems. If we are not the 
cause of our actions, then how can we be held responsible 
for them? 
For example, a man suddenly experiences a strong de-
sire to kill his neighbour. God, in accordance with the 
laws of mind and body, produces the bodily movements and the 
crime is committed. But who is responsible for it? Natur-
ally, the crucial question is who caused the original desire? 
If it is God, as Occasionalism demands, then the man was not 
free in his action, but acted merely as God's instrument of 
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murder. He could not, therefore, be held responsible for it. 
We will now consider how Malebranche tackles problems 
such as this, and whether he was successful in ensuring a 
place for free-will within an Occasionalist framework that 
seems to deny it. 
To determine the role that free-will plays within 
Occasionalism, it is necessary, first of all, to define what 
Malebranche understands by the term. He begins with what he 
considers to be the "will 11 • 
Volante 
par ce mot de VOLONTE', ou de capacite qu 'a 
l'ame d'aimer differens biens, je pretens 
designer l'impression ou Ze mouvement 
naturet, qui nous porte vers Ze bien 
indetermine & en genera t. ( 1) 
This impulse, created within all humans by God, is an 
invincible inclination towards general and undetermined 
good. It is, in effect, a manifestation of the love that 
God has for Himself, since God has no other end than Himself 
in all His operations. 
Comme il n'y a proprement qu'un amour en 
Dieu, qui est !'amour de lui-m~me; & que 
Dieu ne peut rien aimer que par cet amour, 
puisque Dieu ne peut rien aimer que par 
rapport a lui: aussi Dieu n'imprime qu'un 
amour en nous, qui est l'amour du bien en 
general . ( 2) 
4.4 
As Ginette Dreyfus writes in her essay "La libert~ de 
l'Homme": 
La volonte de l'homme, ce n'est pas autre 
chose que l'amour m@me dont Dieu s'aime 
necessairement et invinciblement, ce n'est 
pas autre chose que la volonte de Dieu 
traversant pour ainsi dire la creature. (3) 
This impulse would lead ultimately to the supreme good, 
God, but in the meantime it inclines us toward anything that 
appears to us to be good. Thus, when we encounter a finite, 
particular good, we are naturally drawn towards it. But 
whereas the general impulse is invincible, the attraction 
toward the finite good is not, for the very reason that the 
good is finite. Only the supreme good can satisfy our 
desire. The finite good cannot, and realising this we are 
encouraged by the general impulse to continue searching. 
We are, therefore, capable of resisting the finite 
good, and of redirecting the impulse towards other finite 
goods. 
L'ame est poussee sans cesse vers le bien 
en general: elle desire de posseder taus les 
biens: elle ne veut jamais borner son 
amour: il n'y a point de bien qui luy 
paroisse tel, qu'elle refuse d'aimer. 
Done lors qu'elle jou1t actuellement d'un 
bien particulier, elle a encore du mouve-
ment pour aller plus loin: elle desire 
encore autre chose par l'impression 
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naturelle & invincible que Dieu met en 
elle; & pour changer son amour ou pour le 
partager, il suffit de lui presenter un 
autre bien que celui dont elle jou1t, & 
de lui en faire goater la douceur. (4) 
It is this ability that is fundamental to our freedom. 
Libert~ 
Ainsi le principe de notre liberte c'est 
qu'etant faits pour Dieu & unis a lui nous 
pouvons toujours penser au vrai bien, ou a 
d'autres biens qu'a ceux ausquels nous 
pensons actuellement; c'est que nous 
pouvons toujours suspendre notre consente-
ment & serieusement examiner si le bien 
dont nous joUissons est ou n'est pas le 
vrai bien. (5) 
Our freedom of choice is ensured by two things. 
Firstly: 
la force qu'a l 1eaprit de detourner aette 
impression vera lea objets qui noua 
plaiaent~ & faire ainai que nos inclin-
ations naturellea soient termineea d 
que Zque objet particu lier. { 6) 
And more importantly, the freedom to give or withhold our 
"consent" to the particular object once we have it under 
consideration. As Frederick Copleston writes: 
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In other words, if I once apprehend or 
think of something as good, my will goes 
out towards it. But at the same time I 
am capable of refusing my consent to this 
movement or impulse in so far as it is 
directed towards this particular finite 
good. ( 7) 
It is clear that there must be two levels of "consent" 
in this process. As Henri Gouhier writes in La Philosophie 
de Malebranche: 
il y a deux temps dans le r8le de la 
volont~: elle intervient d'abord pour 
suspendre son consentement, puis pour 
le donner ou le refuser. (8) 
The first role is a "freezing technique", the will 
suspending any decision on the good whilst the second faculty 
of the human mind, the understanding, considers it. 
C'est, en effet, dans ce temps d'arrgt 
que l'entendement examine si le bien 
propose est ou n'est pas le vrai bien ou 
si le mouvement qui nous porte vers cet 
objet s'accorde exactement avec celui 
qui nous porte vers le vrai bien. (9) 
In doing this, the will assumes an attitude of indifference 
towards the good which is essential to our freedom. Without 
this power of indifference, the will would continually lead 
itself into error by assenting to any good it encountered. 
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With it, however, it is able to suspend all decisions until 
the true worth of the good has been determined by the under-
standing. When this has been done: 
c'est la volonte qui juge veritablement 
en acquies9ant a ce que l'entendement lui 
represente et en s'y reposant volontaire-
ment. (10) 
This consent can take two forms, as Daisie Radner 
identifies in Malebranche. 
First, one may judge that a thing is a 
good. To do so would be to accept the 
thing as worthy of love. An error in 
this regard would be a moral transgression. 
Second, one may judge that an object is 
the supreme good. To do so would be to 
accept the thing as worthy of love no 
matter what else has to be sacrificed. 
An error in this regard constitutes sin. (11) 
The way to avoid such error is to make as much use as 
possible of our ability to suspend our consent, and never 
to consent to any good until we are certain of its worth. 
Malebranche formulates two general rules for doing this; 
one for the sciences: 
On ne doit jamais donner de aonsentement 
entier. qu'aux propositions qui paroissent 
si evidemment vraies~ qu'on ne puisse le 
leur refuser sans sentir une peine 
interieure & des reproahes secrets de 
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la raison. {12) 
And the other for morals: 
On ne doit jamais aimer absolument un 
bien3 si l'on peut sans remors ne le 
point aimer. (13) 
At this stage two important points regarding human 
free-will begin to emerge. Firstly, the exercise of freedom 
involves an exercise of "consent 11 • And secondly, this con-
sent is a judgement on the part of the will, in close 
relationship with the understanding. We will now consider 
this relationship in a little more detail. 
Entendement et Volante 
Pour conna1tre le mecanisme de nos actes 
libres, il faut envisager en detail la 
double activite de l'entendement ou faculte 
de conna1tre et de la volonte ou faculte 
de choisir. (14) 
In Book One, Chapter One of the Recherche, Malebranche 
considers the nature and properties of the human mind. 
L'esprit de l'homme n'etant point material 
ou etendu, est sans doute une substance 
simple, indivisible, & sans aucune 
composition de parties: rnais cependant on 
a coutume de distinguer en lui deux facultez, 
s~avoir, l'entendement & la volonte 
lesquelles il est necessaire d'expliquer 
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d'abord, pour attacher ~ ces deux mots une 
notion exacte: car il semble que les 
notions ou les idees, qu'on a de ces deux 
facultez, ne sont pas assez nettes, ni 
assez distinctes. (15) 
Being obscure, Malebranche proposes to clarify them by 
comparison with the properties of matter. 
Entendement 
La matiere ou l'etendue renferme en elle 
deux proprietez ou deux facultez. La 
premiere faculte est celle de recevoir 
differentes figures, & la seconde est la 
capacite d'~tre m~e. De m~me l'esprit 
de l'homme renferme deux facultezi la 
premiere qui est Z'entendement, est celle 
de recevoir plusieurs id~es 3 c'est-a-dire, 
d'appercevoir plusieurs chosesi la seconde 
qui est Za voZonte 3 est celle de recevoir 
plusieurs incZinations 3 ou de vouloir 
differentes choses. (16) 
The faculty of receiving figures is dealt with first. 
Extension is able to receive two sorts of figure. "Les 
unes sont seulement exterieures, comme la rondeur a un 
morceau de eire: les autres sont interieures, & ce sont 
celles qui sont propres a toutes les petites parties, dont 
la eire est composee". (17) The former Malebranche calls 
"figure", the latter, "configuration". 
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Likewise, the understanding's perceptions are twofold. 
Les premieres que l'on appelle perceptions 
pures, sont, pour ainsi dire, superficielles 
a l'ame: elles ne la penetrent & ne la 
modifient pas sensiblement. Les secondes 
qu'on appelle sensibles, la penetrent plus 
ou moins vivement. (18) 
At this point two things should be noted. Firstly, 
whereas the sensible perceptions are modifications of the 
mind, the pure perceptions are not. This becomes signifi-
cant later in our discussion. Secondly, and more importantly 
for the present, the understanding is a purely passive 
faculty. 
de m&me que la faculte de recevoir differ-
entes figures & differentes configurations 
dans les corps, est entierement passive, & 
ne renferme aucune action: ainsi la faculte 
de recevoir differentes idees & differentes 
modifications dans l'esprit, est entierement 
passive, & ne renferme aucune action. (19) 
It is this passive faculty, or capacity of the human 
mind to receive ideas and perceive modifications that 
Malebranche understands by 11 l'entendement". 
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Volonte 
Malebranche then moves on to consider the nature and 
properties of the second faculty, the will. Again, he begins 
with a comparison with extended matter. 
God. 
L'autre faculte de la matiere, c'est 
qu'elle est capable de recevoir plusieurs 
mouvemens; & l'autre faculte de l'ame, 
c'est qu'elle est capable de recevoir 
plusieurs incLinations. (20) 
The cause of both motion and inclination is the same, 
De m~me que l'Auteur de la nature est la 
cause universelle de tous les mouvemens, 
qui se trouvent dans le matiere; c'est 
aussi luy qui est la cause generale de 
toutes les inclinations naturelles qui 
se trouvent dans les esprits. (21) 
Moreover, just as an object set in motion will proceed 
in a straight line, unless it encounters another object 
that disturbs it, so the inclinations of the soul describe 
a straight line towards God, unless they are redirected by 
finite goods. 
This is where the comparison ends, however, for there 
is one aspect of the will that differs markedly from matter. 
Car la matiere est toute sans action: 
elle n'a aucune force pour arr~ter son 
mouvement, ni pour le determiner & le 
detourner d'un cote plutot que d'un autre ... 
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Mais il n'en est pas de m~me de la volonte, 
on peut dire en un sens qu'elle est 
agissante, parce que notre arne peut 
determiner diversement l'inclination ou 
l'impression que Dieu lui donne. Car quoi 
qu'elle ne puisse pas arr~ter cette 
impression, elle peut en un sens la detourner 
du cote qu'il lui plait. (22) 
The will, then, is an active faculty, and it is this 
ability to direct the general impulse towards particular 
goods that forms the basis of our freedom. As Malebranche 
writes: 
par celui de LIBERTE•, je n' entens autre 
chose que la force qu'a l'esprit de 
detourner cette impression vers les objets 
qui nous plaisent, & faire ainsi que nos 
inclinations naturelles soient terminees 
a que lque objet particu Zier. (23) 
This power does operate under certain restrictions, 
however, for we can only direct ourselves towards goods that 
we are aware of. 
Mais il faut bien remarquer, que l'esprit 
considere comme pousse vers le bien en 
general, ne peut determiner son mouvement 
vers un bien particulier, si le m~me esprit 
considere comme capable d '·idees, n 'a la 
connoissance de ce bien particulier. Je 
veux dire, pour me servir des termes 
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ordinaires, que la volonte est une 
puissance aveugle, qui ne peut se porter 
qu'aux chases que l'entendement lui 
represente. ( 2 4) 
It clear, then, that the two faculties of blind 
volition and passive understanding share a rather unusual 
partnership, much like a blind man pushing a paraplegic 
around in a wheelchair. Whilst the paraplegic has no motive 
power he can, however, see the road ahead and the direction 
it follows. The blind man cannot, but he can wal.k and move 
the wheelchair as well, following the directions and advice 
of his partner. 
Conclusion 
Considered in isolation, Malebranche's notion of free-
' 
will is quite straightforward. We are drawn inevitably to-
wards goods, but at the same time are capable of refusing 
our consent to any particular good, and redirecting ourselves 
towards other goods. 
When we recall, however, that this process is to take 
place within a causally impotent creature, things are not 
quite so simple. 
Our discussion will now consider what happens when 
this notion of free-will is placed in an Occasionalist con-
text, particularly the problems that arise and whether they 
are serious enough to render Occasionalism and human freedom 
imcompatible. 
54 
CHAPTER FIVE 
FREEDOM AND OCCASIONALISM 
Introduction 
As we have seen, the giving or withholding of consent 
is central to Malebranche's notion of freedom. To be free, 
therefore, it is essential that the consent is also free, 
i.e., that we are entirely free to give or withhold it. This, 
however, leads to problems when placed within an Occasional-
ist framework. Occasionalism is primarily concerned with 
causation. One might ask, then, as Antoine Arnauld did in 
R~flexions, what the cause of the consent itself might be. 
Again, two possibilities arise - God or ourselves. 
A convincing notion of freedom seems to demand the 
latter, for we must be entirely free to give or withhold the 
consent. If we are not, and are determined in some way, then 
we cannot be held responsible for any resulting choice or 
action. But if we are the cause of the consent, then there 
is something for which God is not the cause, which is con-
trary to Occasionalism. 
If, on the other hand, God is the cause, as Occasion-
alism demands, then it is difficult to argue for human free-
dom, when the determinant of our actions is created within 
us by a higher authority. 
Naturally, the problem of compatibility is far from 
being as simple as that. For example, it is quite feasible 
within Occasionalism that both God and ourselves are the 
cause of the consent - God as true cause, we as occasional 
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causes determining God to produce the consent within us. 
This does, however, lead to its own problems, which we will 
consider presently. 
But in the meantime, it underlines two points crucial 
to this discussion. Firstly, we cannot begin to understand 
Malebranche's notion of freedom without a clear understand-
ing of what it is to consent. Secondly, if humans are to be 
free, it is necessary that their consent also be free. 
Consequently, the question we must now answer is this - What 
precisely is consent, and where does it come from, ourselves 
or God? 
Consent 
It will be recalled from Chapter Four, that when we 
encounter a particular good, we are naturally drawn towards 
it by the invincible impulse implanted in all of us by God. 
This inclination toward the particular good is not 
itself invincible, however, for we are able to suspend our 
movement towards it, examine the good and then decide on its 
relative worth. 
Consent, then, is based on an examination, or judge-
ment, of the good, made by the active will according to in-
formation it receives from the passive understanding. 
The question that inevitably arises here is, from 
where does the understanding receive the information in the 
first place? It cannot produce it itself, for it is a 
purely passive faculty, and can only receive ideas from some 
other source. The question is where? 
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Malebranche considers the various possibilities in the 
Recherche,. Book Three. He begins by defining what is meant 
by "idea". 
Je croi que tout le monde tombe d'accord, 
que nous n'appercevons point les objets 
qui sont hors de nous par eux-m~mes ... & 
l'objet immediat de notre esprit, lorsqu'il 
voit le Soleil par exemple, n'est pas le 
Soleil, mais quelque chose qui est intime-
ment unie a n~tre arne; & c'est ce que 
j'appelle idee. Ainsi par ce mot idee, je 
n'entends ici autre chose, que ce qui est 
l'objet immediat, ou le plus proche de 
l'esprit, quand il apper~oit quelque 
objet. (1) 
He then adds that everything we perceive belongs to 
one of two sorts of perceptions- "ou elles sont dans l'ame, 
ou elles sont hors de l'ame". (2) The perceptions inside 
the soul are its various modifications, such as "ses propres 
sensations, ses imaginations, ses pures intellections, ou 
simplement ses conceptions, \ses passions m@me, & ses inclin-
ations naturelles". (3) And as they are "in" the soul, we 
have no need of ideas to perceive them. 
elles ne sont que l'ame m~me d'une telle 
ou telle fa~on; de meme que la rondeur 
reelle de quelque corps, & son mouvement 
ne sont que ce corps figure, & transporte 
d'une telle ou telle fa~on. (4) 
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But it is the other sort of perception that interests 
us here, i.e. those things outside the soul and particularly 
material things, for we can perceive them only by means of 
ideas. But material things are extended, and ideas are un-
extended, so how do these ideas enter our mind? 
Malebranche posits five possibilities. 
que les idees que nous avons des corps, 
& de tous les autres objets que nous n'-
appercevons point par eux-m~mes, viennent 
de ces m~mes corps, ou de ces objets: ou 
bien que n8tre arne ait la puissance de 
produire ces idees: ou que Dieu les ait 
produites avec elle en la creant, ou qu'il 
les produise toutes les fois qu'on pense 
a quelque objet: ou que l'ame ait en elle-
m@me toutes les perfections qu'elle voit 
dans ces corps: ou enfin qu'elle soit unie 
avec un etre tout parfait, & qui renferme 
generalement toutes les perfections intellig-
ibles, ou toutes les idees des @tres creez. 
(5) 
He then dismisses each one in turn (6), except the 
last, and here we encounter Malebranche's other celebrated 
doctrine, the Vision in God. 
Vision in God 
God has within Himself "les idees de tous les @tres 
1\ qu'il a crees, puisqu'autrement il n'auroit pas pu les 
produire" . ( 7) 
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Moreover, because of His omnipresence, God is in 
close union with our minds. 
de sorte qu'on peut dire qu'il est le lieu 
des esprits, de m~me que les espaces sont 
en un sens le lieu des corps. (8) 
From these two points the Vision in God is formulated. 
Our minds are able to see all the works of God in God, 
"suppose que Dieu vei.iille bien lui decouvrir ce qu'il y a 
dans lui qui les represente". (9) In other words, when we 
perceive an idea of an external object, that idea does not 
come from the object itself. Rather, because we share in 
the Universal Reason, the idea we perceive is God's own idea 
of the object. And since God has the ideas of all things 
within Him, then we have access to an infinity of information. 
il est certain que tous les ~tres sont 
presens a notre esprit; & il semble que 
tous les ~tres ne puissent ~tre presens 
a notre esprit; que parce que Dieu lui est 
present, c'est-a-dire, celui qui renferme 
toutes chases dans la simplicite de son 
etre. ( 10) 
Moreover, the ideas we receive are very accurate. 
la connoissance que nous en avons est 
tres-parfaite ... nous ne pouvons desirer 
d'avoir une idee plus distincte & plus 
feconde de l'etendue, des figures & des 
mouvemens que celle que Dieu nous en 
donne. (11) 
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This is because the ideas we have of objects are God's 
own ideas, i.e. the objects' archetypes, and are, therefore, 
perfect. 
But this raises a problem. If ideas are so perfect, 
then why is it we sometimes see them in an obscure way? 
Malebranche's answer is that what characterizes an idea as 
clear or confused is its apprehension, and not the idea, per 
se. As Daisie Radner writes: 
Clearness and distinctness, obscureness 
and confusedness, characterize our percep-
tions of ideas ra.ther than the ideas them-
selves. (12) 
The way that we can ensure a clear and distinct appre-
hension of an idea is through "attention", which Malebranche 
describes as a "priere naturelle 11 which the will makes to the 
Universal Reason in order to receive enlightenment from it. 
L'homme participe ~ la souveraine Raison 
& lui est uni, & la verite se decouvre a 
lui a proportion qu'il s'applique a elle, 
& qu'il la prie. Or le desir de l'ame est 
• 1\ • 
une priere naturelle qu1 est tou]ours 
exaucee; car c'est une loi naturelle que 
les idees soient d'autant plus presentes 
a l'esprit, que la volonte les desire 
avec plus d'ardeur. (13) 
Thus, the more we desire to think of something, the 
clearer our idea of that thing will be. The desire is it-
self inefficacious, however, just as the desire to raise my 
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arm is inefficacious. The true cause o~ enlightenment is 
God. The effort of attention is the occasional cause of 
enlightenment. 
In terms of our consent, then, it is clear that God 
plays a very important role in the whole process. He inclines 
us toward the good in general, presents a particular good 
and modifies our mind with sensations of it, and when we 
reserve our decision and request information on that good by 
the natural prayer of attention, He provides this information 
as well, in accordance with the laws of the union of the 
soul with the Sovereign Reason. 
Is there room left for freedom in a scheme such as 
this, in which consent, the very essence of freedom, is 
influenced by information coming directly from God? 
Power of Veto 
The answer to this question depends on one very import-
ant point. In making a judgement on a particular good are 
we able to disregard, or veto, the information we receive 
from God? If not,the consequences are quite clear. If we 
are obliged to follow God's information, then it is God who 
determines our judgement and, therefore, consent. There 
would be only one decision to make, and this would be dic-
tated by God. There would be no room for freedom. 
For example, a man encounters a peach and eats it. 
Savouring its taste and texture, he recognizes it as a good. 
But being uncertain as to the extent of its good, or whether 
it is the supreme good, he requests information on it from 
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the Universal Reason. God responds by informing him that it 
is merely a fruit, and that it is right down near the bottom 
of the Order of lovable objects, i.e. that he should not love 
the peach as the supreme good. 
Now, a consistent notion of freedom demands that the 
man be able to disregard this information. Otherwise, he is 
determined by what God advises. Religion, too, demands this 
ability. 
In any Christian philosophy, man must have the freedom 
to sin. Sin, in Malebranche 1 s system, is loving a particular 
good as if it were the supreme good, i.e. a consent to the 
.wrong good. If that consent is determined by a higher author-
ity, then the man cannot be held responsible for it, for he 
is merely a puppet. Responsibility for the consent, and 
therefore the sin, would lie with the higher authority, in 
this case God, which is of course completely unacceptable to 
the theologian. 
In short, Malebranche must grant to us this power to 
disregard God 1 s advice, even though it is an ability that 
will inevitably lead us into error and sin. To be respons-
ible for sin, we must be free to sin. 
Where, then, does this power of veto lie? Since 
judgement is a cooperation of the understanding and the will, 
it must be with one of these faculties. It cannot be the 
understanding, however, for it is a purely passive faculty 
and can only receive ideas, not actively reject them. 
This power must lie with the active will. But this 
leads to several problems, for the will is a blind faculty. 
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la volont:e est une puissance aveugle, 
qui ne peut se porter qu'aux chases que 
l'entendement lui represente. (14) 
It is unable to make its own examination of the good 
and it cannot create its own ideas, for this would consti-
tute a creative power denied by Occasionalism. Does this 
mean that if the will chooses to disregard the ideas pro-
vided by God, it isolates itself from its only source of 
information, and becomes a truly blind faculty, making its 
judgements in complete darkness? 
The key to this lies with the distinction made earlier 
between perceptions inside the soul and those of things 
external to the soul which require ideas to represent them. 
There are three kinds of human perception - pure understand-
ing, sensation and imagination. The ideas from God pertain 
to the former, but the soul can still receive information on 
the particular good from the latter two. 
It is sensation that is of primary importance here, 
i.e. the production by God of sensations in our mind in the 
presence of material objects. Imagination is merely the 
faculty of producing images of these objects in their 
absence. 
Thus, when the man encounters the peach, his mind is 
affected by modifications representing the shape, colour and 
feel of the peach. When he eats it, God produces the sen-
sation of sweetness, and so on. All of these modifi:cations 
are produced by God, according to the laws of mind and body. 
The senses, therefore, do act as sources of information, 
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so if the will disregards the ideas supplied to the pure 
understanding, it can still make its judgement based on some 
knowledge of the particular good. 
This knowledge, however, is deceptive, for the occas-
ional causes of the sensations are not the external objects 
themselves, but the disturbances they produce in our bodies. 
The senses, as Malebranche warns in Book One, Chapter Five 
of the Recherche, should never be treated as accurate inform-
ers. 
Nous devons observer ~xactement cette 
regle. De ne juger jamais par Zes sens 
de ee que Zes chases sont en eZZes-m~mes~ 
mais seuZement du rapport qu'eZZes ant 
avec notre corps. (15) 
Before the Fall, the First Man's senses functioned as 
they were supposed to, as advisors of what was necessary for 
the conservation of his body and as a warning system guard-
ing against danger and damage. As absolute master over his 
body, Adam had complete control of his senses, and could 
even shut them off if he so wished, once they had performed 
their advisory role. 
ed. 
After he had sinned, however, this dominion was revers-
Ses sens & ses passions se revolterent 
contre lui, ils n'obe1rent plus a ses 
ordres, & ils le rendirent, comme nous, 
esclave de toutes les choses sensibles. (16) 
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It is by accepting the evidence of the senses as 
indicative of the nature of the external bodies that we are 
led into error. To blame the senses themselves for this 
error is unfair though, for their nature has not changed 
since before the Fall. What has changed is the extent to 
which we allow ourselves to be distracted by them. Our 
senses still faithfully inform us of the objects we encounter. 
We deceive ourselves, and lead ourselves into error and sin, 
when we make precipitous judgements on this information. 
The antidote for this disorder is twofold - Firstly, 
never make over-hasty judgements based on what the senses 
tell us, and keep in mind that they are incapable of indi-
cating the nature of bodies in themselves. And secondly, 
make a greater effort to heed the information that God pro-
vides to us by virtue of our union with the Sovereign Reason. 
The will, then, is capable of disregarding God's advice. 
To do so, however, leads us into a realm of confusion and 
inevitable error. And while it is desirable to avoid this 
error, it is, nevertheless, essential we are able to fall 
into it. 
To avoid it, we must make greater effort to listen to 
God's advice, and to follow it whenever we are judging the 
worth of a particular good. It is important to note that by 
heeding this advice, we in no way detract from our freedom, 
for it is one thing to be obliged to do action "A", and quite 
another to have a choice of actions and subsequently to choose 
action uA", even though the outcome is the same. We might 
often follow God's advice, but this is not to negate our 
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freedom, so long as we have the choice not to follow it. 
In short, to avoid error it is essential that we 
follow God's advice. But to be free, it is essential that 
we are able not to follow it. Both philosophy and theology 
demand this. Error and sin are to be avoided, but it must 
be up to us to avoid them. And to be able to avoid them, we 
must be free to commit them in the first place. Such is the 
very essence of Christian moral teaching. 
With the power of veto, the Vision in God can be de-
fended against the charge that it gives God control over our 
consent. With our ability to disregard the information He 
provides, God's role is that of an advisor only. 
The doctrine does lead to other problems, however, 
which must be dealt with here. 
The Meno Paradox 
According to the Vision in God, "attention" is a 
natural prayer that we make to the Sovereign Reason, in order 
to be enlightened by it. 
c'est une loi naturelle que les idees 
soient d'autant plus presentes a !'esprit, 
que la volonte les desire avec plus 
d 'ardeur. (1 7) 
An idea is provided to my mind by God on the occasion 
of my desiring to be enlightened by it, i.e. I desire to 
think of an object or concept and God responds by providing 
the idea. But to desire to think of an object, say a tree, 
requires that I already have the idea of a tree in my mind, 
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for I cannot desire something of which I am ignorant. More-
over, as desiring is a function of the will, and as the will 
can only be directed to things that the understanding presents 
to it, then again, the will can only desire what the mind is 
already aware of. But if the mind is already aware of an 
idea, then there is no reason to desire to have the idea. 
Malebranche is, therefore, led right into the Meno paradox. 
Malebranche's answer to this problem was to introduce 
degrees of awareness of an idea. 
De plus il est necessaire qu'en tout terns 
nous ayons actuellement dans nous-rn&mes 
les idees de toutes chases, puisqu'en tout 
terns nous pouvons vouloir penser a toutes 
chases: ce que nous ne pourrions pas, si 
nous ne les appercevions deja confusernent, 
c'est-a-dire si un nombre infini d'idees 
n'etoit present a notre esprit~ car enfin 
on ne peut pas vouloir penser a des objets 
dont on n'a aucune idee. (18) 
At all times we perceive an infinite number of ideas, 
albeit confusedly. Thus, when we desire to be enlightened 
by an idea, we are merely requesting a clarification of an 
obscure idea we already have. And the more effort of 
attention we make, the clearer the idea we receive. This 
is, in effect, a version of the famous Platonic argument for 
Recollection, which maintains that ignorance is not a com-
plete lack of knowledge, but only "forgetfulness" on our 
part. 
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Malebranche's own theory of "indistinct perception", 
put forward in the Recherche, presupposes that for each 
material object, there is a corresponding particular idea in 
the Sovereign Reason. Therefore, for each separate object, 
a separate idea is needed to represent it. 
In the :Eclaircissements of a year later, however, 
Malebranche has changed his tune, denying the correspondence 
between particular objects and particular ideas in God. 
Il ne faut pas s'imaginer que le monde 
intelligible ait un tel rapport avec le 
monde material & sensible, qu'il y ait 
par exemple un soleil, un cheval, un arbre 
intelligible destine a nous representer le 
soleil, un cheval & un arbre; & que tous 
ceux qui voyent le soleil, voyent necessaire-
ment ce pretendu soleil intelligible. (19) 
Instead of a separate idea representing each separate 
object, the Sovereign Reason contains a single idea of 
extension, from which the nature of all bodies can be de-
rived. Malebranche termed this single idea "intelligible 
extension". Thus, when I see a horse, it is a portion of 
the intelligible extension revealing itself to my mind. 
Malebranche, himself, did not consider this new theory 
a shift in his view of the Vision in God. Rather, it was 
merely a more detailed explanation of what was put forward 
in the Recherche, i.e. the Recherche was concerned with 
explaining that we see all things in God, and the Eclaircis-
sement with explaining how this is done. 
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Several of his critics were not easily convinced of 
this though. Antoine Arnauld maintains, in his Des vraieset 
s fausses idees, that Malebranche has presented two quite 
different theories, the latter being a retraction of the 
former. He also contends that the idea of intelligible ex-
tension is contrary to the teachings of Saint Thomas Aquinas 
and Saint Augustine, who both support the notion that God 
contains a particular idea for each separate thing in His 
creation. 
Several later writers support Arnauld's criticism. 
Francisque Bouillier, in Histoire de la Philosophie 
Cartesienne of 1854, agrees that the Recherche and the 
Eclaircissements propose two quite different theories - one 
containing an infinity of separate ideas, the other support-
ing one single idea. 
R.W. Church concurs with Bouillier. 
In the first version of the theory of the 
Vision in God, ideas are regarded as being 
intrinsically individuated and self-identical. 
The Tenth EcZairaissement explains that the 
difficulty of understanding how the idea of 
the sun could become larger and smaller as 
does the appearan~e of the sun itself, 
forced Malebranche to reconsider his 
original view of ideas. Hence,we now find 
him abandoning the conception of a plural-
ity of self-identical ideas, and asserting 
instead that what we see in God is an in-
telligible extension. (20) 
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Malebranche was able to extricate the Vision in God 
from the problems of the Meno paradox, but in doing so he 
exposed himself to the attack that he had shifted ground 
over the doctrine. Whether this is true, or whether the 
Eclaircissement really was an elucidation of the original 
theory, as he claimed, is difficult to determine and beyond 
the scope of this thesis. But the problems surrounding the 
Vision in God are important to this discussion, for the 
doctrine is central to the question of consent, and consent 
is central to the question of freedom. Moreover, these 
problems are essentially problems of Occasionalism. The 
Vision in God is not a separate doctrine, but Occasionalism 
extended onto the epistemological plane. As with the motion 
in my arm, God is also the true cause of my mind's enlight-
enment by ideas. And as my desire to move acts as the 
occasional cause determining God to produce the motion, so 
my desire to know is the occasional cause of my knowledge. 
When Malebranche defends these doctrines of Occasion-
alism and Vision in God against the charge that it is God 
who creates the consent within us, it must be kept in mind 
that our freedom depends on this consent being wholly our 
own. If God causes it then we are not free. But as he 
elaborates the notion of continuous creation, that charge 
becomes even more acute. 
Creation Continuee 
It will be recalled from Chapter One that continuous 
creation was .a Cartesian notion put forward in the Medita-
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tions. It involves the view that the conservation of an 
object over a period of time is really its continuous re-
creation. It is a view that Malebranche himself accepts 
without question. 
Un corps existe, parce que Dieu veut qu'il 
soit: il continue d'@tre par ce que Dieu 
continue de vouloir qu'il soit: & si 
Dieu cessoit seulement de vouloir que ce 
corps fut, des ce moment il ne seroit 
plus. (21) 
The same power that created a body ex nihilo is 
required to keep that body in creation. This power is God's 
alone. Conservation, therefore, is nothing other than God's 
continuous creation of the body at successive moments. But 
to create an object ex nihilo, or to re-create it at succes-
sive moments, is also to create it in such and such a state, 
i.e. in motion, square, round and so on. 
In effect, God's continuous creation ensures not only 
an object's existence, per se, but also all its determinate 
states, i.e. its substance and all its modifications. This 
includes human beings. 
With respect to the human soul, then, God is directly 
responsible for both its creation and all its modifications 
at any given moment. Thus, it is God who creates us stand-
ing when we stand, and thinking when we think. 
quand nous parlons ou marchons, quand 
nous pensons & voulons, Dieu nous fait 
tels que nous semmes, il nous cree parlans, 
71 
marchans, pensans, voulans. (22) 
Is it also God who creates us consenting when we 
consent? 
If so, then human freedom is illusory, for if the 
consent is created within us at a given moment, then there 
is nothing and no-one that can change it. 
Nothing can make a substance exist in a 
certain manner if its creator does not 
produce it in that manner. (23) 
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In short, our behaviour with respect to particular 
goods would be determined by the state in which God decided 
to re-create us at that moment. Moreover, if God creates 
all acts of consent, and sin is consent to the wrong good, 
then we have returned to the charge that God is the author 
of sin. Consequently, the notion of continuous creation 
leads to the same unpalatable philosophical and theological 
conclusions that we have already encountered. 
The key to this problem once again lies with the nature 
of the consent, particularly whether it can be regarded as a 
modification of the human soul. It is on this question that 
Malebranche builds his defence. 
Malebranche's approach to the problem is to maintain 
that consent to an inclination is not, unlike the inclination 
itself, a modification. This defence employs two arguments. 
The first once again uses the analogy of matter. The 
inclination toward a good is like motion in an object, i.e. 
a modification requiring a force to produce it. This force 
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is God, or more particularly, 11 l'efficace creatrice de la 
volonte de Dieu". (24) 
Consent, however, is like "rest" or "repose" in an 
object - a condition of stasis, requiring no force to pro-
duce it. When we consent to a good, we merely 11 rest" with 
it. Accordingly, to sin is to rest with a particular good, 
when we should carry on towards God. It contains nothing 
positive or real. 
Clearly, the defence that Malebranche is putting 
forward is the traditional Augustinian reply that sin is a 
non-being, an absence of action rather than a positive 
action itself. As Thomas Lennon writes in Philosophical 
Cormnentary: 
The soul gives itself no new modifications 
when it consents: when it consents to the 
good, it does only what God does in it; 
when it consents to false goods,it does 
nothing. ( 25) 
But it is very doubtful whether Malebranche reaches 
the shelter of the Augustinian defence, for several problems 
immediately arise. 
Firstly, in Malebranche's view, to consent is to do 
nothing, i.e. it denotes an absence of any positive action. 
It can be argued though, that consent actually is a positive 
action. If, by doing nothing, I fail to do some other 
action that has been prescribed (viz. carry on towards God), 
then I am "doing something other" than that prescribed 
action. In this sense, consent can be construed as positive. 
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As long as there is a prescribed action set down, then to 
"do anything other 11 than that action is to do "something", 
even if it is to do nothing. 
It is the analogy of matter, however, that leads 
Malebranche into more serious difficulties. According to 
this analogy, the inclination to good equals motion in a 
body, and consent equals rest or repose. But rest in a body 
is merely the absence of motion. In no way can the same be 
said of consent, which cannot be the absence of the inclin-
ation. The inclination is constant and invincible; it can-
not be absent. 
If this line of argument is taken one step further, 
Malebranche's analogy, and indeed his whole defence, breaks 
down even more. Since the inclination to the good in general 
is constant and invincible, then by consenting to a particu-
lar good, the soul is not merely "resting" "tolith that good, 
but "resisting" the general impulse that impels it further. 
Consent, then, is not to do nothing, as Malebranche claims, 
because one cannot rest in the constant stream of the general 
impulse. To remain with a good is to resist that impulse, 
and resistance requires an opposing force. 
Consider a man crossing a swiftly flowing river. If 
the general inclination to the good is the current, then to 
remain in one place in the river, requires the man to resist 
the current, to brace himself against it. If he does nothing, 
or 11 rests", as Malebranche would have him do, he would be 
swept away. 
Consequently, consent requires a force to produce it, 
for it is a positive action. It is not merely the absence 
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of something else. 
Does this also mean that consent is a modification of 
our soul? To determine this, it is necessary to consider 
the meaning of the word "modification". This is, in fact, 
what Malebranche does in the second argument for his defence. 
In Reflexions sur le premotion physique, Malebranche 
defines a modification as: 
ce qui ne peut changer, qu'il n'y ait 
quelque changement reel ou physic dans la 
substance, dont elle est la modalite. (26) 
As its name suggests, a modification brings about some 
~hange in its substance, it "modifies" it. Malebranche's 
argument is that when a soul consents to its inclination it 
does not bring about any real change in itself. Is this 
true? 
Firstly, before we encounter a particular good, our 
inclination is towards God. After the encounter, our inclin-
ation is towards the particular good. It is this inclination 
that we consent to or not, as the case may be. By consenting, 
however, we must resist the general inclination, and this 
resistance is in our soul. This is one change our consent 
engenders. 
Secondly, consent is a judgement, and our judgements 
do affect our later perceptions and beliefs. For example, 
by judging that the colour red is proper to the tomato, i.e. 
belongs in the tomato, I am consenting to an illusion that 
will seriously alter my later perception of the material 
world. This is another change my consent brings about in my 
mind. 
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The same is true with the memory. Judgements which 
are later found to be erroneous will be remembered. For ex-
ample, if I consent to a peach as the supreme good, and 
consequently realise the extent of my error, my behaviour 
towards peaches, or anything resembling them will be consid-
erably changed. 
In short, my consents do modify my mind, by bringing 
about new states of mind. They do not produce them as such, 
for only God can do this. They do, however, act as occasion-
al causes, making a difference to what God produces as real 
cause, much like any other modification. 
In conclusion, then, it can be strongly argued that 
consent is a modification of the soul. The problem of divine 
control of consent is, therefore, exacerbated, for only the 
creator of being can create modes of being, and the only one 
with such a creative power is God. 
Desire - the Key to Consent 
There is one possibility left to ~1alebranche. It is 
quite possible that, although it is God who creates the con-
sent within us, it is we who, as occasional causes, determine 
Him to do so. In this case responsibility for the consent 
would be ours, as would sin, moral action, and any other 
consequence of the consent. But this would depend on one 
crucial condition - that the desire to consent were ours. 
If it were not, then both freedom and responsibility are 
removed from us. 
Our original question, therefore, has taken one step 
back - Who is the cause of the desire to consent? Once again, 
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there are two possibilities, ourselves or God. 
If it is the former, as freedom and moral responsibil-
ity demand, then there is something for which God is not the 
cause, which is contrary to Occasionalism. If, however, it 
is God, then there is no place for freedom within Occasion-
alism. God creates the desire within me. This desire then 
determines God to act in a particular way. Consequently, 
God is determining Himself to produce effects. Humans are 
reduced to the mere instruments of these effects, having no 
say in them at all. 
Moreover, if God does cause the desire, then presum-
ably He does so by a general volition. But as we found in 
Chapter Three, this leads us to enquire what is the occasion-
al cause that determines the efficacy of this general voli-
tion? That must be some antecedent desire, for which the 
same questions can be asked in an infinite regress. 
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CONCLUSION 
It would appear that the two areas of Malebranche's 
philosophy central to this thesis are at odds. Human free-
dom demands certain conditions that Occasionalism necessar-
ily excludes. Malebranche is, therefore, faced with a 
dilemma. He would like to reserve a place for freedom 
within his doctrine, but cannot. Either he must grant us 
freedom and relinquish Occasionalism, or uphold his doctrine 
and reduce us all to puppets. There is no compromise. 
This fundamental imcompatibility of freedom and 
Occasionalism is not immediately apparent in Malebranche's 
philosophy. By an interpretation of freedom based on 
"consent", Malebranche succeeds, to an extent, in reconcil-
ing the two areas. By maintaining that consent is not a 
modification of the human soul, he is able to reserve a place 
for freedom beyond the scope of God's direct control. Con-
sent, he argues, is something we do, and choose to do, using 
our own initiative. It is this ability that forms the basis 
of our freedom. 
The arguments in support of this view, however, are 
weak, and the analogies faulty. It can be strongly argued 
that consents make a considerable difference to our present 
and later perceptions of the goods we encounter, "modifying" 
our soul much like any other modification. As modifications, 
they can have only one cause, God, as both Occasionalism and 
"continuous creation" demand. Consequently, the charge 
reasserts itself, that freedom is not freedom if it is 
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dictated by God. 
From here, there is only one defence open to Male-
branche. By conceding divine causation of consent, he can 
still maintain human control over it, if he can prove that 
the human desire to consent acts as its occasional cause, 
determiPing God to produce the consent within us. This, how-
ever, depends on one essential condition - that we have 
absolute control over the desire. It is with respect to 
this that the fundamental incompatibility of freedom and 
Occasionalism becomes apparent. 
The only way we can have absolute control over the 
desire is if we are its real cause. We cannot be its 
occasional cause, for this presupposes some antecedent 
d~sire, leading us directly into an infinite regress. We 
either have this real causal power or we do not. 
Consequently, there are only two possibilities open to 
Malebranche. Either we are the true cause of our desires, 
or God is. Freedom demands the former and Occasionalism 
demands the latter. There is no compromise that will satisfy 
both. 
It is the human desire that holds the key to the en-
tire question of freedom and moral responsibility. If I 
experience the desire to kill my neighbour, that desire must 
be my own. If God causes it within me, then He is initiating 
a chain of determinants over which I have no control, and for 
which I share no responsibility. In short, freedom and 
responsibility both demand that we are, at least, the real 
cause of our own desires. 
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The Error of Occasionalism 
The doctrine of Occasionalism took seed in the Islamic 
desire to vindicate the absolute omnipotence of Allah and 
the dependence of His created realm. The Augustinian inspir-
ation that motivated Malebranche's own Occasionalist doctrine 
was the same. 
But between the motive and the mature doctrine a change 
seems to have occurred. The former is primarily concerned 
with establishing God's omnipotence, the latter with proving 
our impotence. The two are not the same thing, and it is 
this shift in emphasis that is the unnecessary and fundamen-
tal flaw of Occasionalism .. 
To ensure the absolute omnipotence of God, it is not 
necessary to establish the complete impotence of creatures. 
Whether we have causal power or not makes no difference to 
the extent of God's power, since His power is infinite and 
absolute. Omnipotence does not demand that God is the only 
being with power 1 but rather that He is the only being with 
absolute power. 
Likewise, dependence on God does not mean impotence. 
The more a doctrine makes us dependent on Him, the more 
attractive it will be to the Christian philosopher, but only 
to a point. By extending that dependence to its logical 
conclusion, human impotence, the Occasionalists introduce a 
set of problems and unresolved questions that risk denying 
the very attributes of God they wish to extol. Nothing in 
Christian teaching demands our impotence. Indeed, is it not 
more worthy of a wise and benevolent God to create man with 
a modicum of His own power? We have been created in His own 
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image, after all. With such power, all the problems of 
human freedom and moral responsibility that concern this 
thesis are avoided. 
By setting out to prove the impotence of creatures, 
however, Malebranche is led into a sea of troubles. Each 
problem that arises must be resolved within the Occasionalist 
framework, which then leads to other problems, and then 
others, in a spiral of complexities. Consequently, by the 
time the doctrine has been fully expounded, it has led to a 
view of reality so rarified and so far removed from common 
sense as to be absurd. Even David Hume was alarmed by the 
doctrine. 
so extraordinary, and so remote from 
common life and experience. We are got 
into fairy land, long ere we have reached 
the last steps of our theory. (1) 
Several other British commentators were more direct 
with their language. John Sergeant described Malebranche as 
a: 
very Ingenious and Eloquent Person, who 
has a peculiar Talent of talking Nonsense 
as prettily and plausibly as any Man I 
ever read. (2) 
Despite Malebranche's attempts to reconcile them, 
Occasionalism and freedom are entirely incompatible. Either 
we are causally impotent or we are free, but not both. To 
maintain both is to embrace the fundamental contradiction 
characteristic of Malebranche's doctrine. As Daisie Radner 
expresses it: 
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Man is totally dependent on God, but 
not quite. (3) 
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